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Lessons from the Collapse
of Three State-Chartered Private
Deposit Insurance Funds
by Walker F. Todd
M. he January 1991 collapse of the
Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indem-
nity Corporation (RISDIC) was the last
in a series of post-1970 failures of state-
chartered, privately operated deposit
insurance funds for thrift institutions,
industrial banks, and some credit unions.
The failures began in Mississippi in
1976 and continued in Nebraska and
California (1983), Ohio and Maryland
(1985), Utah and Colorado (1987), and
Rhode Island (1991). By February 1989,
even the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation's (FSLIC) authority
to accept new conservatorships or receiv-
erships was effectively suspended. The
Resolution Trust Corporation was cre-
ated the following August to administer
the resolution of insolvent thrifts whose
deposits were FSLIC insured, and the
FSLIC was abolished (Kane [ 1992];
U.S. House of Representatives [1985]).
This Economic Commentary analyzes
the collapse of RISDIC with a view to-
ward distinguishing the elements of
failure and resolution that it shared
with other large state-chartered deposit
insurance funds — principally the
Ohio and Maryland funds — from
those that were unique to Rhode Island.
Also examined are the factors that led
to differences between the solution cho-
sen by state and federal officials in
Rhode Island and those used in Ohio
and Maryland. Finally, inferences are
drawn from these episodes for the de-
sign and viability of private deposit in-
surance plans.
• Background
Federal deposit insurance did not exist
until 1933, but several states introduced
private deposit insurance schemes in
the early part of this century. By 1933,
however, all of the state plans had
failed (Todd and O'Driscoll [1993]). In
the 1950s, interest in private deposit in-
surance was revived: Ohio enacted its
private deposit guaranty association
law, covering building and loan and
savings and loan associations (S&Ls) in
1955, and Maryland enacted its private
deposit insurance law for S&Ls in
1962. RISDIC was chartered in 1969
and commenced business in 1971 with
40 member credit unions and insured
share accounts of $134 million.
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During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
a secular rise in interest rates adversely
affected the profitability of many thrifts,
and their loan and investment powers
were expanded without a proportionate
increase in the accuracy of accounting
rules or in effective supervision. These
factors eventually brought to light net-
worth crises in both the federal and
state-chartered thrift institution deposit
insurance systems (Kane [1989, 1992]).
Such problems, sometimes exacerbated
by fraud, first overwhelmed the smaller
state-chartered insurance funds (Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, and a small California
fund for "thrifts and loans"), and then
affected the largest state-chartered
funds (Ohio and Maryland) by 1985.
The FSLIC itself is now generally rec-
ognized to have been effectively insol-
The collapse of the Rhode Island Share
and Deposit Indemnity Corporation
in January 1991 ended a two-decades-
long cycle of failure of state-chartered
deposit insurance funds. Although
these failures exhibited common char-
acteristics, they also differed mark-
edly in many respects. This article
explores the three leading failures —
in Rhode Island, Ohio, and Maryland
— and draws some lessons for the de-
sign and viability of private deposit
insurance plans.
ISSN 0428-1276vent on a market-value accounting ba-
sis by 1980, even though that insol-
vency was not publicly acknowledged
by the responsible officials until late in
the decade.'
Officials in charge of most of the re-
maining large state-chartered private
deposit insurance funds took steps after
the Maryland collapse in May 1985 to
prevent similar problems in their states.
In Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania, for example, the compa-
rable deposit insurance funds generally
urged members who could qualify to
apply for federal deposit insurance as
soon as possible. They remained in
business only as backup insurers for de-
posits in excess of the $100,000 federal
limit (the Massachusetts model) or for
institutions that were too small to qualify
for federal deposit insurance — typi-
cally, those with less than $5 million of
total deposits (see Kane [1992]).
Rhode Island officials, on the other
hand, ignored the disturbing signs from
Ohio and Maryland and even raised
RISDIC's insured deposit limit to
$500,000 (with unlimited coverage on
certain accounts) in late 1985. Despite
explicit warnings from the Rhode Is-
land attorney general and the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, no plan for
the orderly winding up of RISDIC's
affairs was implemented (Gregorian
[1991]; Syron [1991J). A bill filed in
1986 to require federal deposit insur-
ance for qualifying RISDIC institutions
failed in the legislature and was never
reintroduced (Pulkkinen and Rosen-
gren [1993]; Gregorian [1991]).
Also, adverse trends regarding the sol-
vency of the largest RISDIC member,
Marquette Credit Union, were noted in
the outside auditor's report on RISDIC
as early as 1981. Marquette had $339
million of total assets at book value
when it was closed in January 1991
and held about one-fifth of all deposits
insured by RISDIC.
3 However, the
emergence of problems at specific institu-
tions could easily have escaped the notice
of RISDIC's board of directors, who ap-
parently did not review examiners' re-
ports and who had no audit committee
looking over the work of RISDIC's out-
side audit firm (Gregorian [1991J). The
RISDIC board shared one significant
trait with the failed Maryland insurance
fund: A majority (15) of its members
were representatives of the insured in-
stitutions, and only three directors were
appointed to represent the public inter-
est. In Maryland, the insured institu-
tions appointed eight of the 11 direc-
tors (ibid, and Preston [1986]).
The precipitating factors in RISDIC's
collapse were two failures of insured
institutions during 1990 that essentially
depleted the funds available to RISDIC
and precipitated runs on other insured
institutions in November and Decem-
ber of that year, after the second institu-
tion (Heritage Loan and Investment
Company) failed on November 16.
Those runs deeply wounded a third in-
sured institution, Rhode Island Central
Credit Union, which was on the brink of
failure due to termination of its credit line
by its principal liquidity lender on De-
cember 31,1990. RISDIC's board of di-
rectors met that day and requested the ap-
pointment of a conservator to take over
its affairs. These events prompted Gover-
nor Sundlun to order all RISDIC-insured
institutions closed as his first significant
act upon assuming office on January 1,
1991 (Gregorian [1991]).
• Common Factors in the
Downfall of the Ohio, Maryland,
and Rhode Island Funds
The private deposit insurance funds in
all three states had some common char-
acteristics that led in various degrees to
their ultimate collapses. All were domi-
nated by the regulated industry (state-
chartered S&Ls in Ohio and Maryland
and credit unions in Rhode Island), and
all seemed to have considerable influ-
ence in their state legislatures regard-
ing the expansion of their lending and
investment powers (as distinguished
from the lesser restraining influence of
the relevant state supervisory and regula-
tory bodies).
The problems of the largest insured in-
stitutions were identified in supervi-
sory examinations or outside audits
years before the final collapses of the
insurance funds in each state. However,
for a variety of reasons — summarized
in one account as a lack of necessary
supervisory "clout" — ineffective cor-
rective actions or, as in Ohio, virtually
no corrective actions at all were taken.
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The state political authorities in each
case initially attempted to deny the
magnitude and seriousness of the insur-
ance fund's problem once the insolven-
cies of the insured institutions posing
the largest risks to the fund were re-
vealed. They used devices like I) the
self-evidently deficient capitalization
of the successor fund in Ohio (Kane
[1992]), 2) the appointment of conser-
vators instead of receivers in all three
states once the largest insolvent insured
institutions and the funds themselves
were shown to be profoundly insolvent
and not merely temporarily illiquid (see
Todd and O'Driscoll [1993]), and 3)
strategies based on the groundless as-
sumption that the FSLIC (Ohio and
Maryland) or the National Credit Union
Administration (Rhode Island) would
take the worst cases off their hands with-
out substantial injections of state funds/
The primary common element among
the collapses of the three funds was
their incapacity to exercise sufficient
supervisory authority to limit risks or
to impose effective risk-based deposit
insurance premiums to make unwise
risk-taking more costly for the insured
institutions creating the largest risks.
In the absence of effective restraints on
risk-taking, and without adequate insur-
ance reserves or assurance of replenish-
ment following recognition of loss, any
large loss was bound to undermine pub-
lic confidence in each fund and to trig-
ger rational runs by depositors on other
institutions insured by the same fund if
the solvency of those other institutions
was also questionable. In each of the
three states, the political authorities
waited until runs had spread to several
other institutions insured by the same
fund before closing all the privatelyinsured firms or imposing limitations
on withdrawals.
• RISDIC's Collapse versus
Those in Ohio and Maryland
Some factors, however, clearly sepa-
rate the collapse of RISDIC from the
Ohio and Maryland failures. The princi-
pal economic factor behind the failure
of RISDIC-insured institutions was
real estate loan and investment losses
in New England, which were particu-
larly severe between 1989 and 1992
(Randall [1993]; Syron [1991]). The
failures of the privately insured institu-
tions in Ohio and Maryland causing the
largest losses were attributable to im-
prudent involvement with fraudulent
government securities dealers.
7 Real
estate loan and investment losses were
significant in the Maryland crisis and
in Ohio for institutions other than
Home State, the largest failed S&L.
While geographic concentration of
lending and investment risks generally
exacerbates the tendency of depository
institutions to fail during regional eco-
nomic downturns, the extreme degree
of geographic concentration in Rhode
Island, combined with the particular na-
ture of the primary loan and investment
risk of the RISDIC-insured institutions
(real estate), made the proportional loss
from book value during the regional
downturn much greater, on a fundwide
basis, than actually occurred in Ohio
and Maryland (Syron [1991]). Fund
losses did not exceed 10 percent of in-
sured deposits in Ohio and Maryland,
but in Rhode Island, that share ap-
proached one-third.
In each of the three states, the private
deposit insurance fund had become fair-
ly large before the final crisis struck:
Ohio had $4.2 billion of insured depos-
its in 70 institutions, with $130 million
available to the insurance fund; Mary-
land had $7.2 billion of insured depos-
its in 102 institutions, with $175 million
available to the insurance fund; and
Rhode Island had $1.8 billion of in-
sured deposits in 46 institutions as of
September 30, 1990, the last calendar
quarter before Governor Sundlun
closed the 45 remaining institutions,
with $25 million available to the insur-
ance fund (Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland [ 1985J; Gregorian [ 1991 ]).
In Rhode Island, the comparative im-
portance of the RISDIC problem was
somewhat more pronounced than in the
other two states because RISDIC in-
sured 357,000 individual accounts,
about one for every three residents.
Some notable differences emerged in
the failure resolution techniques used
by state and some federal officials in
the three states studied. In Ohio, the
governor proclaimed an emergency
bank holiday that required all institu-
tions insured by the failed private fund
to close until they were either assured
of receiving federal deposit insurance
or sold or merged into a federally in-
sured institution. The remaining institu-
tions, except for Home State, the larg-
est and most profoundly insolvent firm,
were allowed to reopen under the supervi-
sion of the state's Division of Savings
and Loans on a limited-withdrawals
basis, in most cases not more than $750
per account per month (later increased
to $1,000).
While all depositors of institutions in-
sured by the failed fund were denied ac-
cess to their funds during the emer-
gency holiday period (March 15-21,
1985), the combination of full and par-
tial reopenings on and after March 21
enabled depositors at 59 of the 68 re-
maining institutions to gain at least par-
tial access to their money by March 25.
The State of Ohio committed $151 mil-
lion of nontax revenues (including liq-
uor monopoly and lottery surpluses) to
support bonds issued to fund the re-
openings, and full access to deposits
was restored at all but one small institu-
tion ($59 million of assets) by January
3, 1986. Depositors of all but three in-
stitutions received full availability of
funds within six months after the March
closings (Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland [1985]).
In Maryland, queues of depositors seek-
ing to withdraw their money from Old
Court Savings and Loan, the largest se-
verely impacted privately insured insti-
tution (nearly $1 billion of total assets),
were shown on television newscasts on
May 9, 1985, and such visible runs
then spread to other privately insured
institutions, especially Merritt Commer-
cial Savings and Loan Association. The
$200 million estimated loss at Old
Court alone exceeded the $175 million
available in the Maryland private insur-
ance fund. By May 13, conservators
were appointed for both Old Court and
Merritt, and on May 14, Governor
Hughes proclaimed a state of emer-
gency that limited withdrawals from all
privately insured S&Ls to $ 1,000 per
account per month. By January 1986,
more than $1.15 billion of Maryland
deposits were still frozen, not even
available for partial withdrawals.
The eventual solution involved a com-
bination of state-sponsored bond issues
and a continuation of withdrawal limi-
tations at Old Court and Community to
provide a full return of principal over
five years: Some Maryland depositors
were not repaid in full until 1989. How-
ever, state authorities decided to avoid
a complete closing of all privately in-
sured institutions, totally froze the
claims of depositors at only three insti-
tutions, committed sufficient state-
sponsored bond revenues to cover all
insured deposits over five years, and
avoided "haircuts," or partial final
payouts to depositors (Preston [1986];
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
[1985]). The Maryland solution dif-
fered substantially from the Ohio and
Rhode Island solutions because of the
lengthy delay in the full return of in-
sured deposits and the avoidance of a
complete closing of all privately in-
sured institutions.In Rhode Island, depositors obtained
the full return of their principal far less
quickly than in Ohio but far more
quickly than in Maryland. While both
Ohio and Maryland officials requested
federal financial assistance to resolve
their deposit insurance fund problems,
only Rhode Island received such direct
assistance, a federal loan guarantee for
bonds issued by the Depositors Eco-
nomic Protection Corporation (DEPCO).
DEPCO is the state-chartered entity
whose bond issues funded the liquida-
tions of the remaining RISDIC-insured
institutions and provided some liquidity
to the frozen claims of depositors in
RISDIC-insured institutions (U.S.
House of Representatives [1991]). As
in Ohio, Rhode Island authorities or-
dered all privately insured institutions
completely closed, which had the effect
of freezing all deposits until the affected
firms were sold, merged, or liquidated.
Fortunately, from the depositors' view-
point, there were no involuntary haircuts
or discounted returns of their deposit
principal.
• Differences in Resolution Methods
The resolution methods employed in
these three states show that some meth-
ods are superior to others for specific
purposes, but each state also experi-
enced shortcomings in the resolution
methods actually chosen. In Ohio, the
emergency closing of all privately in-
sured S&Ls forced state officials to
deal with the crisis in a more compre-
hensive way and more rapidly than
would likely have been the case if a re-
gime of partial withdrawals had been
pursued from the beginning. Further,
the Ohio solution was also the cheapest
of the three in terms of the expenditure
of state-controlled funds, and it caused
a more rapid return to full availability
of the principal amount of deposits for
nearly all depositors, with no direct fed-
eral financial assistance.
In Maryland, the emergency restriction
on withdrawals tended to stop the runs
on both solvent and insolvent institu-
tions and temporarily relieved state po-
litical officials of some of the senti-
ment of urgency that was present in
Ohio. However, this measure may have
unnecessarily constrained the search
for a solution for depositors with fro-
zen claims.
In Rhode Island, the emergency clos-
ing of all RISDIC-insured institutions
halted the runs, but may have inadver-
tently created long delays for depositors
in obtaining full access to their deposit
principal. About two-thirds of all de-
positors' claims were still frozen for the
greater part of 1991, and doubts regard-
ing the soundness of Rhode Island's
state-supervised institutions contributed
to a second series of runs that forced
the late January 1991 closing of a much
larger institution. Old Stone Bank of
Providence ($1.9 billion of total as-
sets), a state-chartered savings bank in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Old Stone's depositors
were not delayed in gaining access to
their funds because their accounts were
covered by federal deposit insurance
(Vogelstein [1993]). The percentage of
losses in Rhode Island was so large (ap-
proaching one-third of RISDIC-insured
deposits) that a state-only solution ap-
peared politically impractical. In 1993,
however, DEPCO took a special charge
of $31.9 million for complete defea-
sance of the remaining federally guar-
anteed bonds. By so doing, the state
has in fact achieved an entirely state-
funded solution.
Unfortunately, from the taxpayers' van-
tage point, depositors' potential losses
in Rhode Island were distributed over a
pool of taxpayer households that was
roughly identical to the pool of deposi-
tor households. In Ohio and Maryland,
depositors' losses could be distributed
over larger population sets because de-
positor households represented a small
share of taxpayer households. There-
fore, it was unlikely that Rhode Island's
chosen solution was politically feasible
without the federal government bearing
the residual risk of loss via the SI80
million federal loan guarantee for the
1991 series-A DEPCO bond issue.
• Conclusion
R1SDIC was the last of the large state-
chartered private deposit insurance funds.
Its failure, along with the earlier fund
collapses in Ohio and Maryland, tends to
support some general inferences regard-
ing private deposit insurance, cross-
guarantee arrangements, private clearing-
houses, and the like, but it also provides
far less support than might be imagined
for other general inferences. Foremost
among those supported is that great care
must be taken in any private deposit in-
surance fund or analogous arrangement
to prevent the largest institutions from ex-
ercising undue influence over examina-
tions, accounting matters, premium ad-
justments for risk, and the timing and
basis of appointment of receivers and
conservators. Steps to ensure the inde-
pendence of a majority of the insurance
fund's directors would help to prevent
such undue influence. But it probably is
too strong an inference to conclude from
the Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island
examples that private deposit insurance
cannot work anywhere: It can and should
work properly if the structural inde-
pendence of the governing board of the
insurance fund deprives the most politi-
cally influential institutions of the fruits
of their influence in the matters men-
tioned above.
However, as in Rhode Island, the exis-
tence of any kind of federal safety net
(in that case, a federal loan guarantee;
in cross-guarantee plans, the availabil-
ity of federal deposit insurance as a
backup) tends to create a moral hazard
problem for state and private insurance
fund officials: Why should they be-
come more effective in assessing and
responding to increased risk in their in-
sured institutions if a federal rescue of
some sort is achievable?• Footnotes
1. See generally Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland (1985), Preston (1986), and Gre-
gorian (1991). Credit unions and, prior to
1980, S&Ls typically offered share accounts,
a legal concept analogous to but distinct from
deposit accounts. In an uninsured mutual sav-
ings association, the holders of share ac-
counts are, literally, the owners of the associa-
tion and share in its profits and losses to the
extent that they exceed regulatory net-worth
minimums.
2. See Kane (1985, 1989, 1992) for back-
ground materials on the collapse of thrift de-
posit insurance funds in the 1980s. The role
of improper accounting methodology in ena-
bling the industry's problems to intensify is
addressed specifically in Thomson (1992).
3. One of the principal problems with the in-
stitutional structure of RISDIC identified in
the 1991 investigative report to Rhode Island
Governor Bruce Sundlun was a high concen-
tration of insured deposits in large undercapi-
talized credit unions. For example, the three
largest institutions held about 45 percent of
all RISDIC-insured deposits (about $800 mil-
lion of the $ 1.8 billion total as of September
30, 1990) (Gregorian [1991]). See also Syron
(1991).
4. See Pulkkinen and Rosengren (1993).
5. See generally U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (1985), Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland (1985), Preston (1986), Gregorian
(1991), and Syron (1991).
6. The incapacity of the state-chartered pri-
vate deposit insurance funds to rein in the risk-
taking of the largest institutions was also a
common element in the collapses of state funds
in the early part of the twentieth century (Todd
and O'Driscoll [1993]).
7. See U.S. House of Representatives
(1985) and Preston (1986) regarding Ohio
and Maryland. Large insured institutions in
these states engaged in collateralized reverse
repurchase transactions covering U.S. gov-
ernment securities with securities dealers that
required excess collateral from the S&Ls that
were borrowing funds. Meanwhile, the secu-
rities dealers' collateral custody arrange-
ments were deficient: They used custody re-
ceipts for the same collateral to cover
multiple pledges. Safe collateral procedures
are distinguished from those used in Ohio
and Maryland in Stevens (1987).
8. The average (arithmetic mean) RISDIC-
insured account was less than $6,000, but the
mean is skewed upward by the compara-
tively small number of high-dollar-value ac-
counts. The median account value probably
was somewhat less than $6,000.
9. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991, section 431.
In the May 24, 1991 field hearing of the
House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs
Committee, Rhode Island Governor Sundlun
noted that the state's congressional delega-
tion had two requests before Congress for a
$150 million outright grant and a $150 mil-
lion low-interest loan to DEPCO. Governor
Sundlun made a third proposal, the one actu-
ally enacted, to have Congress provide a fed-
eral loan guarantee for a DEPCO bond issue
in an amount between $ 150 million and $210
million. The amount approved was $180 mil-
lion (U.S. House of Representatives [1991]).• References
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